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This paper analyzes the possibility of irnplementing stable outcomes for 
marriage markets. Our first resiilt shows a contradiction between the use 
of stable mechanisins and the hypotesis of  agents' behaviour consiclered in 
the Nash equilibriurn concept . 
We analyze the possibility  of irnplementing two sets of  stable allocations, 
by employing two types of rnechanisms.  The first mechanisrn is a "now-or- 
never"  choice process that permits us to irnplement in undominated Nash 
equilibria the set of  al1 the stable allocations. 
The second choice process is the classic algorithm in matching theory, the 
&le-Shapley  mechanism. A reversal property is observed in such a mech- 
anism when agents act strategically. The use of a mechanism which selects 
the best  solution for one side of  the market in the absence of  strategic 
behaviour yields the best stable solution for the agents on the other side 
under dominance solvability. 
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